Report by Lieutenant General Charles Foulkes, Chief of the General Staff
to the Minister of National Defence, 9 February 1948
1. I have had the Drew Report of 11 Jul 42 examined along with the Duff and Maltby Reports. Attached is a detailed examination of the various points raised by Mr. Drew with our comments. It appears to me that there would be no useful purpose in continuing to examine and re-examine either the conditions of training or equipment of this Force. I am of the opinion, and it is shared by Field Marshal Montgomery, that the outcome of the Japanese attack on Hong Kong would not have been changed to any appreciable extent had these two battalions been trained and equipped to the same standard as the divisions which invaded France in 1944.
2. The most regrettable feature arising out of the inadequate training and equipping was the effect on the morale and fighting efficiency of the Canadian troops, which unfortunately was interpreted by their British superiors as a lack of courage, willingness to fight and even in some cases cowardice. On the other hand this had caused in the minds of Canadian troops bitterness, lack of confidence and resentment in their British superiors. However, you will recall that after discussing this whole question with Field Marshal Montgomery he agreed to have these offending paragraphs taken out of the Maltby report. Therefore, unless this case is reopened these regrettable circumstances can remain in oblivion.
3. I would strongly recommend that every effort should be made to avoid reopening this Hong Kong enquiry. Much of the evidence given at the time of the enquiry in respect to quality of training and equipment of these troops was based on the very limited experience of Canadian officers gained in the first two years of war before Canadian troops were actively engaged in operations. A great deal has been learned since then about training and equipment and it is very doubtful if the same officers who gave the evidence at the time of the Duff report would make similar statements in view of the lessons learnt from the last war. I doubt if Home, Price and others would agree now that they considered that these troops were adequately trained for war. There is also some doubt about Home himself, he was removed from Commanding a Company in the R.C.R. in 1939 as unfit to command in war, and later was appointed to the R.R.C.
4. In regard to training of troops I would like to point out that the most damaging evidence is that which appears in a cable from the late Brigadier Lawson of 15 Nov 41:--
"Both units contain excellent material and a number of good instructors. Having been employed most of their time since mobilization on coast defence duties, neither has done much field training even of sub units. Neither had completed its Tests of Elementary Training for infantry weapons since many of these have not previously been available for them."
Tests of Elementary Training are those tests which the soldier is required to carry out before he completes recruit training. This evidence shows conclusively that even the recruit training was not completed. Therefore, it is very difficult, by any stretch of the imagination, to say that a unit which contains men who have not completed their recruit training is fit for battle. We found in training formations for war that even after recruit training, section, platoon, company and battalion exercises had to be carried out. Then battle innoculation using live ammunition and exercises in every phase of operations were necessary, I can say this without fear of contradiction that even after four years of arduous training I found the 2nd Canadian Division just ready for battle when we landed in North West Europe, and even after the first battle it was necessary for me to make several very serious changes in order to win further battles.
5. The training of men for war is like training a race horse for a race. It is necessary to re-train after each battle, eliminating the weak, tired, or battleweary, and correcting the mistakes of the last battle to ensure victory in the next. I would emphasize that General Crerar summed this up in evidence on page 33 of the Duff report:--
"To my best knowledge and experience however no battalion of any Army even if fully equipped has ever completed its training. Training is an unceasing process."
Therefore, I feel that no matter how many experts are produced no finality can be reached on this question.
6. The statements made by Mr. Drew regarding the training on the 2 and 3 inch mortar and the handling of grenades are indefensible. No commander responsible for the success of a battle would ever agree that a mortar platoon can be efficient without the most intensive practise with live ammunition.
7. With regard to the letter of 16 Jul 42, Mr. Drew's case appears to be that the decision to send a force to Hong Kong was based on the facts that garrison troops only were required and that time would be available for the completion of training when they arrived in Hong Kong. He claims that further information was received from the UK in a message of 24 Oct 41 which would indicate a change of circumstances in regard to the role of the Canadian troops to be carried out in Hong Kong. He indicates that the contents of this message was known by the officers of the Department. I have had the files of DMO&P searched and there is no evidence of the receipt of any such message. This is also confirmed by the late General Stuart. Therefore, it would appear that if such a message was received it was not passed to the Department of National Defence.
8. I do not think it is necessary to comment on whether or not the decision to send the Force should have been reconsidered at that time as that would be a matter of higher policy.
9. I am returning copy No. 4 of both letters.
CF/3355/fjl
Duff Report Military Comment
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Duff |
Drew | |
p.4 | p.2 | 1. It is apparent that the Department of National Defence was entirely dependent on information provided by the Government of the UK as to whether or not early attack was possible. There is nothing in either the Duff Report or the Appendix to the Report to indicate that the Canadian Army had available to them appreciations and recommendations from a Canadian Joint Intelligence Committee or a Canadian Joint Planning Committee which would enable them to discuss the relative merits of sending a force to Hong Kong. [Author's comment: This is in response to Drew's charge that the US/Canada Joint Defence Board should have been the vehicle whereby the threat of war with Japan would have been passed to Canada. However the JDB dealt only with matters pertaining to the immediate security of North America.] |
4 | 2 | 2. From a military point of view it is hard to reconcile the CGS's comment "both" battalions designated "are units of proven efficiency" with the fact that certain personnel had not even completed basic training, little training had been carried out with the 2" mortar, no firing of live ammunition had been done with the 3" mortar, and troops had not been trained in handling live 36 grenades. In addition to individual basic training, there does not appear in the Report to be any indication that either battalion had carried out any form of sub-unit or unit training. [This comment on Drew's charge concerning lack of training is accurate, except for the fact that both battalions had done a little sub-unit training, though insufficient to affect the main issue.] |
8 | 2 | 3. It is doubtful whether such vehicles as the water tanks about which there is much controversy would have greatly altered the outcome of the action at Hong Kong. Similarly, it is doubtful whether the provision of "A" vehicles for the battalions would have delayed very greatly the inevitable outcome of the Hong Kong action. Nevertheless, to attempt to carry on an action without the battalion mortar carriers and the company ammunition trucks is almost a hopeless task. [This comment, while accurate, skirts the issue. The MT would not have altered the outcome, but it is certain that lack of transport and water caused unnecessary hardship to the defenders, a point the Duff Commission was charged specifically to investigate.] |
54-58 | 2 | 4. From the Report it is quite evident that there was a definite lack of simple army organization in the movement of the vehicles for Force "C" and in the information regarding the movement of these vehicles. |
8 | 2 | 5. It is difficult to understand what the Report means by a "task of considerable difficulty". If the task referred to is that of the despatch of two battalions, presumably for garrison duties, the description of such a task as "considerable difficulty" can only be interpreted as meaning that the organization of the Department of National Defence was woefully lacking. As divisions had previously been despatched "task" cannot be construed as applying to the despatch of the two battalions. On the other hand, if "task" is considered as the operation of assisting to defend Hong Kong, the Duff Report would appear to be inconsistent as in the first part it endeavours to prove that the authorities despatched this force quickly and rapidly merely to bolster a garrison in the light of the fact that they did not expect an early attack by the Japanese. [Duff meant by "task of considerable difficulty" the selection, equipping, and embarkation of C Force.] |
4 | 4 | 6. This same point has been covered under Serial 1 of the Drew Letter above. |
6 | 5 | 7. It is difficult to comment on the percentage of men who had not undergone 16 weeks' basic military training. From the Report it appears that the 6% refers to the actual overall total strength of the two battalions. 6% of the total strength would represent a much greater proportion of untrained personnel within the actual fighting ranks of the units depending upon how many of these untrained personnel were required for administrative or battle troops, From Section IV of the Report Page 35, 136 men were required to bring both battalions up to war establishment and 300 additional men were required as first reinforcements to both battalions. [As only four men with under 16 weeks' training went to C Force HQ, the majority of partially trained personnel went to the two battalions. Whether they went direct to the ranks or as first reinforcements is irrelevant-- first reinforcements can expect to go into battle as soon as casualties occur.] |
6-7 | 6 | 8. It is impossible to condone the remarks of certain senior Canadian officers concerning the fact that these units were of proven efficiency when, in fact, they had not even fired their 3" mortars. The efficient use of the 3" mortar results only from long practice in range and tactical firing. While simple of operation, it is a weapon whose maximum efficiency can only be obtained through skilled sighting and constant firing. The remarks referring to the 3" mortar above apply even more so to the 2" mortar which is practically always used by observed fire. To handle efficiently the 2" mortar requires constant practice. It is a most efficient weapon when used by trained personnel; its value as a weapon becomes almost nil in the hands of untrained personnel. As regards the anti-tank rifle, very little additional training is necessary to convert a trained rifleman to an anti-tank rifleman. ["Certain senior officers' ' include, of course, Major General Crerar and most of the General Staff associated with the despatch of C Force. Foulkes could, however, bave said in mitigation that as both 3-inch and 2-inch mortars were practically non-existent in Canada at the time, this criterion meant no unit in Canada in 1941 could be considered efficient. The two Indian battalions in Hong Kong were in no better state regarding mortar supply and training.] |
8 | 7 | 9. The remarks concerning A vehicles as for Serial 3 above maintain here. |
3 | 8 | 10. On the grounds that the CGS expressed his opinion that there was no military objection to the acceptance of the proposal, it would appear that that officer had come to that conclusion as a result of the recommendations of his staff. The Report indicates that all opinion regarding the acceptance of the proposal was made on the communications received from the War Office, some of which are still privileged documents. However, there is nothing in the Report to show that the Department of National Defence had a staff which could work out the pros and cons of accepting this proposal as a calculated risk of war. In other words, the decision was whether or not to despatch troops based on the information available from the UK Government as opposed to whether or not we agreed with the information provided by the UK Government as to whether or not this was a sound military venture. [This is perhaps the crux of the issue. The author cannot agree with Lieutenant General Foulkes. If Crerar and his staff could not work out the "pros and cons of accepting this proposal as a calculated risk or war" they had no business calling themselves a General Staff. Most of these men had studied Hong Kong, some had been there. They had access to all the relevant studies, defence schemes, and military intelligence. The last sentence is pure bureaucratese. One may ask whether or not to buy a car based on the information provided by the salesman as opposed to whether or not one agrees with the information provided by the salesman as to whether or not that car is a sound purchase. In both cases, one should shop around. None of the General Staff ever asked for a report on Hong Kong at the time. Being responsible for the conduct of Canada's military war effort, they were sold a bill of goods on the strength of one telegram. When the CGS expressed his opinion that there was no military objection to the operation, be was effectively saying, "Although I haven't looked under the hood, I agree with the salesman."] |
4 | 10 | 11. There is nothing to indicate that the Department of National Defence had an organized Joint Planning Committee, Joint Planning Staff, Joint Intelligence Committee and Joint Intelligence Staff. The remarks concerning our dependence on the Government of the UK for information regarding the probability of an attack as stated above apply here. |
4 | 11 | 12. Again, this controversy hinges on the fact that the Canadian authorities were completely dependent on information received from the UK. |
7 | 14 | 13. In the light of experience of World War II it is impractical to consider that all that is required to build a Canadian fighting force is to take the right type of Canadian off the street, put him into uniform and expect him to fight. Granted the right leadership and the right type of men will greatly reduce the time factor in producing an efficient unit, nevertheless there are so many other factors affecting the production of an efficient unit that it is not a justifiable risk to send troops out of the country to an area where there is the slightest possibility of active operations taking place unless the troops are adequately trained for field operations and fit to fight. [This is in reply to testimony of officers at the Commission that as long as the Commanding Officers picked the men, they could "whack them into shape" in no time, as spirit, initiative, and self-reliance are all-important and can cover a multitude of defects. Foulkes properly labels this a fallacy, but the testimony regarding this was so strong that Duff accepted it. Drew's witnesses, mostly First World War officers with battle experience, gave opposite testimony, but this was discounted. Foulke's last sentence really sums up the whole situation concerning training.] |
4, 7 | 15 | 14. While there is little difficulty in training a soldier who has mastered the rifle to use effectively a light machine gun or an anti-tank rifle, the soldier cannot be considered to be trained in these weapons until he has actually carried out a considerable amount of firing, both at range and battle range targets. As stated above, the effective use of the 2" and 3" mortar requires considerable training in the firing of the weapon and in the observation and correction of fire. It is possible that certain individual training could have been completed, on board ship but to rely on shipboard training as the sole means of bringing individual training up to the standard where troops are fit to enter active operations is not consistent with present-day military thinking. |
33 | 17 | 15. It is not possible to reconcile the remarks of the VCGS [Lt. Gen. Stuart] "in my opinion we were generally adequately trained to undertake defensive responsibilities such as those in prospect in Hong Kong" with the Report of Brigadier Lawson that neither of the battalions had completed its tests of elementary training for infantry weapons. It has always been considered that before even the smallest form of sub-unit training could be carried out with any degree of efficiency all tests of elementary training should have been completed. |
43 | 17 | 16. Probably the only time the officers and men of a unit are known to each other on the scale which is ideal is before the unit takes part in its first operation. As a result of operations, units are required to absorb varying percentages of officers and other ranks who on occasions may have to join the unit in the middle of an operation. So long as the reinforce-personnel are adequately trained and know their jobs, mutual understanding within sub-units quickly develops. [In the case of C Force, neither the reinforcements nor the units were adequately trained.] |
5 | 18 | 17. As stated above, soldiers completely trained and practiced in the rifle and bren gun can be trained to handle effectively the anti-tank rifle and the tommy gun in a comparatively short time. However, it is essential that before a man can be considered to be efficient in the handling of these two weapons, he must have carried out both range and battle range firing. [No range or battle range firing was carried out with these two weapons.] |
5 | 18 | 18. As stated above, the efficiency in the use of the 2" mortar depends in the most part on the actual amount of firing which is carried out with the weapon. |
7 | 19 | 19. These cross references are a repetition of previous comments regarding training on board ship. |
31, 27 | 19 | 20. The efficient tactical employment of the 3” mortar does require a great deal of handling and firing. A mortar crew cannot be considered to be efficient in the use of their weapons unless they have actually carried out firing. |
27, 28 | 20 | 21. Although it may be possible to reach a legal conclusion based on the available evidence, it is certainly not a practical consideration to accept the fact that men can effectively use the Mills bomb if they have only practiced with dummy bombs. It is impractical to ask a soldier to use a live weapon for the first time in active operations, [The last sentence summarizes the situation regarding weapon training.] |
58 | 20 |
22. No comment. Any such lack of energy certainly within 1 Cdn Corps would have provided suitable grounds for a field general court martial. [Re: MT for C Force.] |
60 | 21-23 |
23. This is another repetition of the controversy regarding the A echelon vehicles of the battalions. From the Report it would appear that the vehicles hired were of a commercial type and were merely for the purpose of off-loading equipment from the ships. As stated above, the A echelon vehicles of a battalion are most essential to carry out its task. It might well be that the terrain was such that the movement of vehicles was impossible and that, therefore, it could be said that the battalions were not impaired in their task by not having these vehicles. This point could only be ascertained by a detailed study on the ground in question. But apart from this, it is impossible to think of sending a unit into action without its ammunition and weapon-carrying vehicles. [The transport Lawson hired was only for moving from dock to barracks. As far as the terrain of Hong Kong was concerned, MT would have been useful in the many withdrawals and counterattacks despite (or because of the hilly nature of the Island.] |